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1 
Introduction: Japan’s Pacifist Identity and Public Opinion 
Since the inauguration of the Japanese Constitution of 1946, severe constraints 
have been placed upon Japan’s military capabilities. This is due in large part to the 
inclusion of Article 9, which reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.1  
When it was first proposed, Japanese conservatives, which included members of the 
Meiji era government, military, and even some nationalist were averse to accept it as it 
renounced Japan’s sovereign right to wage war. This proved to be inadmissible to 
supporters of the Meiji government as such a maneuver would impair the nation’s deep-
seated ambition of becoming the regional hegemon of Northeast Asia. For other Japanese 
conservatives this was particularly worrying, as it would diminish the government's 
ability to protect the state and its people.2 However, as the majority of the nation favored 
it and the peace that it would bring to a then war torn Japan, any oppositions to the 
constitution and the pacifism that it entailed was overruled. Unwilling to accede, pro-
revision forces, which included Japanese nationalists, militarists, and conservatives, 
actively pursued the eradication of these constraints at the end of the Allied forces 
occupation of Japan in 1952, not long after they were implemented in order to bring forth 
                                               
1 Japanese Constitution of 1946, Chapter 2, Article 9 
2 This is ideology was exemplified in a speech that the former Prime Minister of Japan, Nobosuke Kishi, 
made claiming that if Japan were to become a "respectable member (of) the community of nations it would 
first have to revise its constitution and rearm. If Japan is alone in renouncing war ... she will not be able to 
prevent others from invading her land. If, on the other hand, Japan could defend herself, there would be no 
further need of keeping United States garrison forces in Japan. ... Japan should be strong enough to defend 
herself.” (Richard Samuels. "Kishi and Corruption: An Anatomy of the 1955 System". Japan Policy 
Research Institute. December 2001) 
2 
the “re-normalization” of the Japanese nation. Unfortunately for them their efforts were 
met with limited success. 
Though Article 9 has not been revised since it was implemented in 1947, the past 
two decades have seen an increase in Japanese military capability due to the 
government’s loose interpretation of Article 9 and its limitations to allow for Japanese 
involvement in collective security operations internationally. As a result, a number of 
Japanese political scholars and newspapers have projected the possibility of not only 
Japanese constitutional revision but also the re-militarization of Japan as well.3 Interested 
in finding out whether or not this projection has any likelihood of success in the future, I 
have posed the following question: Why has the constitution and the pacifism that it 
enshrines been so resistant to change despite a changing political context, and does the 
increase of Japanese public support for constitutional revision necessarily mean re-
militarization for Japan? Taking a constructivist approach, I will argue that although pro-
constitutional revision forces in Japan have tried to use fear politics and the revival of a 
Japanese “national spirit” to promote constitutional revision and ultimately re-
militarization, the Japanese public has been relatively unreceptive to their ploy due to the 
integration of pacifism into the Japanese collective identity. 
Using public opinion polling data from the 1990s to the present, I plan to examine 
the ways in which the intervening variable, which in this case is public opinion, affected 
the dependent variable, which is support for constitutional revision, by reacting to 
independent variables such as the resolution made by some political elites to eliminate 
                                               
3 Eugene A. Matthews. “Japan's New Nationalism.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec. 2003), pp. 
74–90. Also can see McCurry, Justin. “Amid Controversy, Japan Weighs Reinterpreting Its Pacifist 
Constitution.” The Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 2014, LexisNexis Academic [LexisNexis];  
and Prime Minister Abe’s Policy Speech at the 166th Session of the Diet. 
(http://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html). 
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Article 9, the textbook campaigns for more nationalistic education during the 1990s, and 
international feedback from allies and neighbors during the Gulf War. Section one will 
give a brief background on the creation of Article 9 and the Japanese Constitution, as 
well as the controversies that surround it. Section two will look at some elements that 
allowed for the integration of pacifism into Japanese national identity. I will specifically 
be focusing on four main factors: (1) Japanese collective memory of World War II, (2) 
education reform following the U.S. occupation of Japan, (3) public support of pacifism 
by major political figures and actors in Japan, and (4) the security that the Japanese 
garnered from their 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation with the United States. By 
evaluating these specific elements, I plan to exhibit the way in which social and historical 
contexts perpetrated the formation of Japan’s pacifist identity and preserved its Peace 
Constitution. 
Section three will focus specifically on examining the factors that caused the rise 
in public support for constitutional revision from the 1990s to the early 2000s. In this 
section I will explore the way in which international criticism of Japan’s “lack of 
adequate involvement” in international peacekeeping operations and issues of instability 
within international security has changed Japan’s public debate around why an 
amendment to Article 9 is necessary and caused a shift in public opinion towards 
potentially supporting its amendment. Section four will explore the way in which the 
push for the revival of the Japanese “national spirit” from the late 1980s to the early 
2000s by pro-revision forces, which include Japanese militarist, nationalists, and 
conservatives, have not been successful in shifting public opinion around revising Article 
9 for the purpose of Japanese remilitarization. This failure is particularly puzzling as 
4 
constitutional revision held support among some of the major political figures in the 
Japanese government, and gained significant popularity among the Japanese population 
after the early 2000s. In the final section of this paper I plan to analyze my findings and 
conclude whether or not Japan will remilitarize based on currently public opinion in 
Japan on the subject. 
 
 
Part 1: The Formation of the 1946 Constitution of Japan and The Peace Clause  
Since its creation, the Constitution of 1946 has always been seen as a 
controversial document, one that has formed a deep divide in Japanese public opinion and 
collective memory. For some conservative and nationalist figures, the 1946 Constitution 
was unacceptable, as it would lower the position of the emperor; weaken the state control 
of education, local government, and political expression; and support labor unions and 
other institutions that they opposed. Japanese liberals however, viewed this new 
Constitution as a symbol of the democratization of Japan and the beginning of a new era 
in Japanese modern history.4 At the risk of oversimplification, support for the 1946 
Constitution can be boiled down to a divide in Japanese public opinion on two main 
issues: (1) the origin and inclusion of Article 9 and (2) whether or not the constitution 
was imposed upon the Japanese people.  
In regards to the origin of Article 9, there is some belief that this ‘peace clause’ 
was created by General MacArthur and thrust upon an already beaten down Japanese 
population. This is contested because Article 9 did not originate from instructions that 
MacArthur received from Washington. In fact, the document SWNCC-228 merely 
                                               
4 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy”. p. 48 
5 
required that ‘the civil reign supreme over the military branch of the government’.5  As a 
result there has been a lot of speculation as to where Article 9 actually came from. Given 
that in the memorandum6 MacArthur handed to the chief of the Government Section, 
Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, contained the first drafting of the peace clause, 
some conservative Japanese, militarists, and nationalist believe that he is the mastermind 
behind it (“MacArthur Notes”). However, there are documents countering such a 
narrative, highlighting that in fact Article 9 originated from one of Japan’s former Prime 
Minister, Kijūrō Shidehara.7  
In relation to the question of the legitimacy of the constitution, there is some force 
in the argument that the post-war Constitution was imposed on a reluctant Japanese 
political establishment. This controversy stems from the fact that not long after SCAP, 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, ordered the new postwar Japanese 
government to revise the Meiji Constitution, General MacArthur himself decided that the 
Government Section (GS) of SCAP would draft the new constitution as the Japanese 
government could not agree on how to revise the constitution and they were quickly 
running out of time to do so. SCAP undoubtedly twisted the arm of the Cabinet by 
writing a constitutional draft based on popular sovereignty and threatening to take it to 
the people if the Cabinet should fail to sponsor it as its own creation.8 In addition there is 
                                               
5 D. C. S. Sissons, ‘The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitution: Legal and Political Problems of 
Rearmament’, International Affairs, vol 37. No. 1 (January 1961), p. 45 
6  Douglas MacArthur. “MacArthur Notes (MacArthur's Three Basic Points), February 3, 1946 | Birth of 
the Constitution of Japan.” National Diet Library, www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html. 
7 During a U.S. senate meeting regarding his dismissal and again in his memoir, MacArthur tells of how on 
January 24, 1946, the Japanese Prime Minister of the time, Kijūrō Shidehara, came to see him and proposed 
incorporating a peace article into the new Japanese constitution (Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, ‘War Renunciation, 
Article 9, and Security Policy’. p. 54). There are also texts that entail Shidehara proclaiming Article 9 as his 
creation as well (Klaus Schlichtmann. Japan In the World: Shidehara Kijūrō, Pacifism, and the Abolition 
of War. vol. 2, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2009.) 
8 J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan, p. 207 
6 
evidence that, “Whitney told members of the cabinet that if the Japanese government did 
not present a revised Constitution similar to the GHQ draft, the person of the cannot be 
guaranteed. It was meant as a warning to the effect that without drastic action to forestall 
the Far Eastern Commission, SCHP would find it difficult to stop the demand from the 
Soviet union and other countries for the emperor to be tried in person”.9 To say that the 
members of the Japanese cabinet were shocked, not only by the war renunciation clause 
in the draft but also by Whitney’s comment that general headquarters could not answer 
for whatever might happen “the person of the Emperor” if the draft were not accepted, 
would be a gross understatement.10 
Taking all of the aforementioned into account, there is no doubt that both 
MacArthur and SCAP, more specifically the Government Section drafting committee, put 
pressure on the Japanese Cabinet to accept the 1946 Constitution. Nevertheless, as was 
discovered in a recent study by Moore and Robinson, “despite a degree of American 
coercion on some aspects of constitutional drafting, in broad terms the new Constitution 
may be regarded as the product of a partnership rather than the simple result of American 
imposition”.11 This is because the Japanese were able to make changes, though somewhat 
minor, to the draft that SCAP proposed. Despite the reservation and dissatisfaction that 
the Cabinet expressed in regard to the initial draft, the Japanese public’s response 
reaction to the new constitution was mostly favorable. Thus, “a new norm began in 
postwar Japan, and it was accepted by the majority of the people”.12 In order to 
understand the manner in which pacifism became entrenched within Japanese society it is 
                                               
9 Theodore McNelly, ‘The Japanese Constitution’, p. 184 
10 Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, p. 133 
11 Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State 
under MacArthur. Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2002 
12 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’, p. 52 
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pertinent that we look at three key factors: (1) the Japanese public’s collective memory of 
life during the prewar and wartime eras; (2) the evolution of the Japanese education 
system after World War II; and (3) the support that Japan’s new pacifist constitution 
received domestically from major political figures. 
 
Part 2: The Integration of Pacifism into Japanese National Identity 
In this part of my thesis I plan to tackle the first half of my research question: 
Why has the Japanese Constitution of 1946 and the pacifism that it enshrines been so 
resistant to change despite the changing political context of Japan and the international 
community? Current literature on this topic has focused heavily on the difficult nature of 
revising the Constitution as a means of explaining the longevity of the document.13 As it 
currently stands, in order for the Japanese people to make amendments to their 
constitution an amendment needs to be initiated by the Diet, attain a two-thirds majority 
vote in both the Upper and Lower Houses, and gain approval from over 50 per cent of the 
Japanese public.14 While the aforementioned is a strenuous process, it alone cannot fully 
explain why it is that the current Japanese constitution has been able to survive for as 
long as it has without being amended at least once. There have to be other underlying 
factors that have hindered the conservative, pro-revision forces in Japan from attaining 
the majority that they need in order to achieve their goal of constitutional revision. Thus 
upon delving deeper into the topic and examining various social, cultural, and historical 
aspects within Japanese society, I have found that factors such as the U.S. - Japan 
                                               
13 See J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan, p. 202-223 
14 Article 96: Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of 
two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special 
referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. (The Japanese Diet. The Constitution of Japan.) 
8 
Security Treaty, Japanese collective memory of World War II, education, and support 
from major political figures were all key elements that influenced and allowed for the 
longevity of the 1946 Constitution and the pacifist ideals that it enshrines. 
 
Security in the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty 
 
One key reason that the Japanese Constitution of 1946 has been able to maintain 
its pacifist nature is due to the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security Between Japan and the United States of America. Written in 1952 and amended 
in 196015, this U.S. - Japan security treaty served to procure military security for a 
pacifist Japan and to solidify the relationship between the two countries with the end of 
the American occupation of the archipelago. The treaty achieved this by corroborating 
the United States’ pledged to defend Japan in the event of an attack.16 This American 
obligation was clearly stated in Article 5 of the 1960 amended security treaty as it 
emphasized that: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.”17 In exchange the Japanese granted the United 
States the right to military bases on the archipelago: For the purpose of contributing to 
the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far 
                                               
15The most important changes that were made during the 1960 amendment was (1) the U.S. commitment to 
defend japan in the event that Japan was attacked, (2) the provision that Japan would be consulted before 
the united States moved major forces into or out of the country, and  (3) the clause allowing either side to 
end the treaty after 1970 with one year’s notice. (Daizo, For Mutual Benefit: The Japanese-US Security 
Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective. p. 2) 
16 Beina Xu. "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance." 
17 Quoted from Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Between Japan and the United States. 
9 
East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of 
facilities and areas in Japan.18  
 This arrangement proved to be extremely favorable to the Japanese as it gave 
them security under the American nuclear umbrella, and allowed them the freedom to 
adhere to the pacifist ideals outlined in their Constitution without having to worry 
excessively about the security of their nation.19 While some nationalists and extreme 
conservatives were not exactly satisfied with the exchange made in the treaty, moderate 
conservatives, representing particularly the business, rural, and bureaucratic sectors, 
which made up a majority of the country avidly approved of it.20 Their approval stemmed 
from the fact that while they supported the creation of modest Self-Defense Forces, they 
preferred to entrust the primary responsibility for the military security of the country to 
the United States. In doing this they believed that Japan could concentrate on other 
pressing domestic issues such as economic recovery.21  
Reveling in the security and freedom that the treaty provided to them, we see 
public opinion in Japan heartily endorse the present U.S. Japan security treaty after its 
April 1996 reconfirmation. One survey showed that 62 percent of the Japanese polled 
considered the Treaty helpful for Japanese security while another found that 70 percent of 
Japanese people agree to the maintenance of the Treaty.22 In essence it can be arguably 
                                               
18 Quoted from Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Between Japan and the United States. 
19 Daizo Sakurada, For Mutual Benefit: The Japanese-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective. p. 
2 
20 Asia for Educators. “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” 
21 Dovetailed with the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy for postwar Japan laid out by then Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru, Japan relied on the United States for its security needs so that country could 
focus on its own economic recovery. (Beina Xu. "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.") 
22 Daizo Sakurada, For Mutual Benefit: The Japanese-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective. p. 
8 
10 
stated that the reason that the Japanese were able to maintain their pacifist ideals is due in 
part to the existence of this mutual treaty of security between them and the United States. 
 
Scars of a Nation: Japanese Collective Memory of World War II and Education Reform 
“The experience of the war should serve to promote peace” - Ienaga Saburō 
 
As the only people in the world to have been attacked with nuclear weapons, the 
Japanese have a special aversion to them, a type of 'nuclear allergy’ if you will.23 In fact 
to this day, the fear of rearmament remains strong in Japan. Looking at some results from 
public opinion polls taken within the last decade, we see that while the majority of 
Japanese support the Self-Defense Forces they do not support the expansion of their 
military capabilities. When asked why they felt that the constitution should not be revised 
27.3 percent24 of respondents answered “Because if revised, road to becoming a military 
superpower may open” and another 26 percent answered “Because basic human rights 
and democracy are protected”.25 This weariness of military power stems from what the 
Japanese feel is their lesson from World War II: “reliance on military power is self-
defeating.”26 
For the Japanese citizens that lived through World War II, “.... civilian wartime 
life could be recalled as an experience in victimhood and suffering.”27 This was due in 
part to the Japanese wartime government's manipulation of their citizens in order to 
acquire support for the war effort, even if it meant increased hardship, suffering, and even 
                                               
23 Asia for Educators. “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” 
24 The percentage of respondents that answered the same question similarly in the March 2007 Yomiuri 
Shimbun poll is equal to 32.1 percent. (Yomiuri Shimbun: March 2007) 
25 Yomiuri Shimbun: March 2008  
26 Asia for Educators. “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” 
27 Wilson, Sandra. “Rethinking Nation and Nationalism in Japan”. Nation and Nationalism in Japan. pg. 17 
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death for them28. The government accomplished this through the use of education to 
promote cultural values such as gratitude, indebtedness, and repayment as means to 
persuade many people to give their lives for the emperor and their country. This made it 
extremely hard for ordinary Japanese people not to support the war, whether they agreed 
with it or not.29 This remembrance of the war has garnered Japanese public fear that “a 
strong military cannot be controlled and would ultimately destroy democracy.”30 As a 
result when respondents to a 2008 Yomiuri opinion poll were asked whether or not they 
thought that Article 9 needed to be revised the public responded as follows: 12.5 percent 
(down 1.5 percent from the previous year’s) were in favor of revising Paragraph 1, which 
stipulates the renunciation of war, while the majority at 81.6% (up 1.3 percent from 
previous year), were against revising this paragraph at all. In regards to Paragraph 2, 
which stipulates that armed forces and war potential will not be maintained, 36 percent 
(down 2.1 percent from previous years) of poll participants answered “yes” this 
paragraph needs to be revised, but again the majority was in favor of keeping it as is with 
54.4% (up 0.3 percent) of the participants voting as such.31 This widespread aversion to 
remilitarization in Japan due to in part to the educational reform that the American’s 
implemented during their occupation period of the Japanese archipelago.   
                                               
28 In addition to enduring harsh labor to craft and procure equipment and supplies for the military, many 
Japanese civilians suffered from food shortages as well. By February of 1941 the Japanese government had 
set up a rationing system that based rice allotment on age, occupation and gender. These food rations also 
included other grains, vegetables, meats, fish, and seasonings. These allotments were severely decreased by 
1943 and people in large cities began not having enough to eat. (Samuel Yamashita. “No Luxuries Until the 
War is Won”. p.35 –61) 
29 The Japanese government and military had Kamikaze pilots (suicide bombers) write ‘last letters’ to their 
families, teachers, friends, and even children as a way of ensuring that they would be driven by feelings of 
gratitude and obligation to want to make more sacrifices as well.  
30 Asia for Educators. “Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” When asked why they felt that the 
constitution should not be revised 26 percent of respondents answered, “Because basic human rights and 
democracy are protected.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, March 2008) 
31 See Yomiuri Shimbun: March 2008 and the Yomiuri Shimbun: March 2007 
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Prior to the Allied Forces occupation of Japan in 1945, the Japanese education 
system was founded on the epoch-making Gakkorei (School Laws)32, which laid the 
foundation for the educational system, and the Imperial Rescript33, which became the 
leading principle of moral education in Japan. This system was co-opted and 
monopolized by the Japanese government after the Manchurian Massacre34 in 1931, 
when a storm of militarism and ultra-nationalism began to blow in Japan. In place of 
nationalistic history textbooks, “official’s sanctioned Tennō-worship and government 
designed courses on official ethics, the content of instruction was liberalized and 
modernized.”35 So, “when the Pacific War opened, the whole country was involved in the 
raging storm. Militarist rulers to influence the people used the Imperial Rescript and 
shushin as a convenient weapon. Loyalty and patriotism were explained as meaning to 
die for the Emperor; the Emperor and the country were the same, and sacrifice of one’s 
life was the highest virtue.”36 
Wanting to prevent another outbreak of Japanese militarism and promote 
democracy within the nation, American Occupation forces not only disbanded the 
Japanese army after the Pacific War ended, but also reformed the Japanese education 
system. Apart of their education reformation was the suspension of shushin courses as 
they realized that it was the weapon through which the Japanese government was able to 
                                               
32 Was introduced in 1886 by Yurei Muri, the first minister of education in Japan. With these laws and the 
curriculum that they entailed, Japanese education covered general areas of study such as reading 
composition, etc. but focused a great deal on moral education. (Oshiba 1961: pg. 230) 
33 “The Rescript consisted of three parts: first, the Emperor told his subjects the essence of the characteristic 
of his country, which must be the basis of education; second, he taught many virtues for them to practice--
filial piety, brotherhood, affection, humility, love of human beings, diligence, bravery, and especially 
loyalty to the Emperor; third, he concluded that those virtues were universal.” (Oshiba 1961: 230-231) 
34 In the original text of the source I read the author used the term “event” instead of massacre. What 
exactly to call this occurrence in history has been under high contention in Japan for a number of years. 
This is due to the desire from conservative individuals to create a more nationalistic education by removing 
as much of the atrocities from Japanese historical events as possible. 
35 Stockwin, J.A.A. “”. Governing Japan. Pg. 231. 
36 Oshiba 1961: 231-232 
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fuel support for the war. In its place the American the six-three-three system37 and 
coeducation, “which had never been dreamed of in Japan”, was enforced. In addition 
Japanese administration became centralized giving rise to decentralization and a new 
system of school boards in Japan. As a result Japanese children received a more liberal 
education in comparison to the pre-postwar era, and the history of Japan’s colonialism, 
expansionism, and wartime atrocities were taught to ensure that history did not repeat 
itself.   
As the decades passed and more and more Japanese children became 
indoctrinated with this liberal education, we see a rise in support for pacifism among the 
Japanese people as their remembrance of the war became connected to their idea of 
pacifism as a part of Japanese national identity.38 This is to say that the Japanese, having 
been taught the atrocities of the war the Japanese have internalized “reliance on military 
power is self-defeating. In this sense it can be argued that Japanese national identity is 
inextricably related to memory. 39  
 
 
 
Support for Pacifism Among Major Figures and Political Actors in Japanese Society 
 
Another reason that pacifism became so deep rooted in post-war Japan is due in 
part to the support that pacifism won among major social figures and political actors in 
the years following the end of the Pacific War domestically. One major social and 
political figure that outwardly supported the 1946 Constitution and the pacifism that it 
                                               
37 Six years of elementary school, three years of junior high, and three years of high school 
38 Trefalt, Beatrice. “War, commemoration and national identity in modern Japan”. Nation and Nationalism 
in Japan. pg. 125. Also see (The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, London: Melbourne University 
Press, 1968) 
39 Wilson, Sandra. “Rethinking Nation and Nationalism in Japan”. Nation and Nationalism in Japan. pg. 16 
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upheld is the current Japanese Tennō, Emperor Akihito. In his inauguration speech, 
Emperor Akihito “used everyday expressions rather than archaic court language. He 
addressed his audience as minasan (literally ‘everybody, but perhaps best translated as 
‘Ladies and Gentlemen’), and boldly declared that he supported the post-war 
Constitution, ‘the only one he has ever known’”40 
An earlier political figure who openly supported the pacifism engrained in the 
1946 Japanese Constitution was Japan’s first Prime Minister after World War II, Shigeru 
Yoshida. A diplomat by profession, Yoshida was one of the most influential politicians in 
postwar Japan. During his Premiership, which lasted from 1946-1947 and again from 
1948-1954, former Prime Minister Yoshida faced pressure from the United States to get 
Japan to increase its military expenditure. However he was able to reject the Americans’ 
attempts by citing the pacifist nature of Japan’s postwar constitution. Wanting to 
establish a precedence of pacifism in Japanese foreign and defense policy, Yoshida 
created what is known as the Yoshida Doctrine, a document that guided Japanese foreign 
policy for decades after its creation.  
With the Yoshida Doctrine Prime Minister Yoshida upheld the pacifist nature of 
the new Japanese constitution by including the following as one of the tenets: “Japan 
should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic 
issues. Not only would this low posture free the energies of its people for productive 
industrial development, it would avoid divisive internal struggles,”41 as the Japanese 
government and public were thoroughly split on the issue of pacifism and 
remilitarization. Seeing talks on these issues as a stagnating, Yoshida effectively shifted 
                                               
40J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan. p. 77. 
41 Tang Siew Man. “Japan’s Grand Strategic Shift from Yoshida to Koizumi: Reflections on Japan’s 
Strategic Focus in the 21st Century”. p. 117-136. 
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the Japanese discourse of national pride away from having a strong formal military, like 
the United States, and instead refocused it on gaining national economic strength, an 
issue that everyone in postwar Japan rallied around. So in effect, with his doctrine 
Yoshida was able to shift the issue of remilitarization off of the Japanese national agenda 
while at the same time reinforcing pacifism as a practice into Japanese foreign policy and 
thus solidifying Japan’s commitment to pacifism. 
 
Part 3: Challenges to Japanese Pacifist Identity 
 In this section of my thesis I will focus on the factors that have challenged Japan’s 
pacifist identity and caused the steady rise in support for Constitutional revision that we 
see from the 1990s to around 2012.42 I will specifically be looking at the way in which 
international criticism of Japan’s “lack of adequate involvement” in international 
peacekeeping operations has affected Japanese public opinion surrounding the need for 
constitutional revision. In addition I will also evaluate how issues of instability within 
international security has changed Japan’s public debate around why an amendment to 
Article 9 is necessary and has caused a shift in public opinion towards potentially 
supporting its amendment. 
 
The Effects of International Criticism for the Gulf War on Japanese Support for Revision 
 
During the postwar period, Japanese pacifism functioned as an ideology and norm of 
non-intervention principles in world affairs. As a result, the majority of Japan’s key foreign 
policy principles were negative in nature: no dispatch of the SDF overseas, non-nuclear 
principles, no export of weapons, and no offensive military doctrine and arms, keeping within 
                                               
42 See Figure 1 in the Appendix. (Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2016) 
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the narrative of Japan’s pacifist identity.43 As a consequence, there were no serious debates in 
Japan on what the nation should do if they were ever needed to help maintain international 
security. However with the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf War, this changed 
as the Japanese were faced with intense pressure from the international community to contribute 
to the humanitarian efforts in the Persian Gulf. As the Prime Minister at the time, Toshiki Kaifu, 
did not identify the invasion as a major national security crisis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regarded the invasion of Kuwait as a normal diplomatic matter. As a result the Japanese 
government’s policy coordination was limited due to the constraints placed on them by Article 9 
and the public’s affinity towards pacifism. This limitation in conjunction and “[t] he lack of 
interagency coordination delayed Japan's response to the crisis and provoked international 
criticism.”44 With this criticism, the Japanese public began to realize that the renunciation of war 
alone could not bring international peace as they had once thought45, and public opinion on the 
strict interpretation of Article 9 began to shift as the Japanese public began to seriously ruminate 
on the necessity of Constitutional revision.  
When the 1990 Gulf crisis arose, officials of the George H. W. Bush administration had 
high expectations: Japan was to provide a substantial contribution to show Congress that it was 
indeed a reliable ally. This conviction arose from scrutiny within the U.S. Congress on the value 
of their asymmetric alliance with Japan as the end of the Cold War virtually removed the Soviet 
military threat: If Japan could not offer more than bases for U.S. forces in the event of a 
contingency on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. Congress would question the value of the U.S.- 
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Japan alliance and might demand termination of the bilateral security arrangement.46 So despite 
knowing Japan’s constitutional restriction on external use of force, the United States nevertheless 
requested that Tokyo not only provide monetary contributions to the cause but also personnel to 
the multinational forces in the region. The list of personnel requests included medical volunteers, 
logistic support in transporting personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia, Japanese help in  
managing the anticipated exodus of large numbers of refugees from Kuwait, and participation in 
the multinational naval force through the dispatch of minesweepers to help clear the Gulf and 
transport the vessels to carry equipment from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.47  
In regards to the request for financial aid for multinational forces in Iraq and economic 
aid in the Gulf region, the Japanese government responded positively and without hesitation. 
However the Prime Minister and the Kantei (Japanese government) did not take the initiative to 
make a concrete decision. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials, who were 
feeling immense pressure from the United States, had to put in a proposal to give the 
multinational forces in the Persian Gulf a couple billion dollars to help with the initiative in the 
region. This caused a delay in the provision of Japanese support to the crisis in the region; as the 
proposal lacked concrete supporting documentation for the amount, the Finance Ministry only 
gave the multinational forces in Iraq $1 billion in aid. So when the Kaifu government announced 
Japan’s initial contribution plan on August 30, 1990, “the international community criticized it as 
“too little, too late.”48 In fact, at the time of the announcement the Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Nobuo Ishihara recalls: “I was with the prime minister when he made the call. Mr. 
Bush usually expressed his appreciation loudly. At that time, however, his response was blunt. It 
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was a disappointment to the United States. Later I learned that Washington expected Japan to 
contribute about $3 billion.”49  
The U.S. again asked the Japanese to contribute to the cause in the Gulf about a week 
after Tokyo announced its initial contribution plan. This time the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Nicholas Brady met with the Kaifu government’s Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and 
requested an additional $3 billion, $1 billion for multinational forces and $2 billion for economic 
relief in the Gulf region. This request was met with hesitation from the Japanese, which caused 
the U.S. Congress to become incredibly frustrated by “Japan’s passivity”.50 As a result U.S. 
House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding that Tokyo bear the entire cost of U.S. 
forces in Japan if the Japanese would not make additional contributions. Two days after the 
resolution was passed, the Japanese government announced that it would provide the additional 
$3 billion in support. Unfortunately, “Japan’s contribution was viewed as a response to pressure 
from the U.S. government, leaving the international community unimpressed.”51 Reflecting on 
this, Foreign Vice Minister Takakazu Kuriyama lamented in his memoir that, “The result was a 
great disappointment to us.”52 
 When it came to the request for Japanese personnel in the region, the request was met 
with much hesitation. This was because the Japanese public was reluctant to dispatch the SDF 
overseas. According to the Asahi Shimbun poll of October 1, 1990, 67 percent of respondents 
approved of providing non-military contribution while only 19 percent replied that they would 
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support the dispatch of the SDF.53 So in response to the request made for personnel, the U.S. 
ambassador to Japan at the time, Michael Armacost, noted then Vice Foreign Minister  
“[Kuriyama] readily acknowledged the importance of a substantial Japanese 
contribution...He hinted at Japan's readiness to offer support beyond financial 
subventions. But he emphatically noted the political and constitutional difficulties 
that would attend any involvement in of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 
the area of strife and clearly signaled that there would be no likelihood that Japan 
would dispatch minesweepers.”54 
 
With the limited policy coordination that the government did have the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs decided to organized a task force that would contribute personnel under the legal 
basis of contribution to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).  
Wanting to legitimize the force, Vice Minister Kuriyama wanted to reorganize the SDF 
so that it could handle peacekeeping missions as well, especially since some of the personnel that 
were contributed were actually members of the SDF. However, as “the dovish prime minister 
was against dispatching the SDF itself,” he instructed that Kuriyama come up with a concrete 
plan to officially remove SDF officers from the multinational forces in the Gulf and instead send 
them as officers of the Prime Minister instead. Though the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) was 
against it, Prime Minister’s plan manifested itself as the first set of UN Peacekeeping 
Cooperation legislation that was introduced to the Japanese Diet in October of 1990. This 
legislation was profoundly flawed however, reflecting severe disagreement within the 
government and LDP. At the Diet debate surrounding the legislature, “the dovish prime minister 
denied that the SDF might be placed in a combat situation, while government officials explained 
that the bill’s wording would indeed allow the SDF to engage in combat areas.”55 The Diet 
deliberations were so controversial that Japan’s five major newspapers--Asahi, Mainichi, Nihon 
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Keizai, Sankei, and Yomiuri--were divided in their opinions about the legislation. Japanese public 
opinion however was firmly in opposition to the bill as 58 percent expressed their opposition to 
the UN Peace Cooperation Bill while only 21 percent expressed support.56 As a result the LDP 
was forced to withdraw the bill. In the end, the Japanese were not able to contribute troops to the 
crisis in the Persian Gulf. 
By the end of the war the Japanese had contributed $13 billion to the multinational forces 
in the Persian Gulf to aid against Iraqi forces. Although the money was welcomed, Japan was 
heavily criticized for refusing to commit personnel to the war, and in the end the international 
community deemed their contribution as merely “checkbook diplomacy.” However the ridicule 
that the Japanese people faced after the war did not end there as two weeks after the Gulf War 
ended, the Kuwaiti government printed a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post and the 
New York Times to thank all of the nations that provided support; and Japan was not included in 
this list. The Japanese government and people were deeply hurt by this, and realized that the 
renunciation of war alone could not bring international peace as they had once thought:  
“[T] he international community’s lack of appreciation bewildered the Japanese 
people. This stinging criticism brought home to their minds the importance of 
sharing the burden with blood, sweat, and tears, and not just with money, as a 
responsible member of the international community striving for the common 
cause of maintaining peace with justice.”57 
 
As a result the Kaifu cabinet dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April of 
1991 with overwhelming support from the Japanese public.58  
The minesweepers were successful in the operations that they conducted and as a 
result were greatly appreciated by the international community. As a result of their 
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success, public support for sending SDF units for peacekeeping activities increased. 
According to Asahi Shimbun’s June 1991 public opinion survey, 74 percent responded 
positively to dispatching the SDF overseas, and another 50 percent supported SDF 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations in contrast to the 40 percent who were 
against it.59  Compared with the public’s earlier opposition to the UN Peace Cooperation 
legislation, these results represented a significant shift in public opinion. As a result the 
Kaifu cabinet submitted another bill to the Diet that would allow for the SDF to 
participate in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations command. The bill was 
passed in 1992, as Japanese public opinion on their responsibility to the international 
community and the nature of the PKOs overcame the vocal anti-militarist opposition 
within and outside of Japan.”60   
With all of the international criticism that they received as a result of their 
responses during the Gulf War, the Japanese public new norm of international 
cooperation began to prevail over Article 9, which had long prevented Japan from having 
an active security policy.61 This discovery was hard learned and came at the hands of 
intense criticism from both the United Stated and the rest of the international community 
in regards to Japan’s international contributions during those turbulent times. 
Embarrassed by their country’s inability to provide anything more than financial 
assistance during the 1991 Gulf War, Japanese public opinion began to waver in its once 
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firm support of Article 9 and the 1946 Constitution.62 In response to increased interest in 
constitutional revision following the Gulf War, a number of proposal for constitutional 
revision began to arise from various political perspectives. Three examples of which 
came from the Yomiuri (1994), the Asahi Shimbun (1995), and Ichiro Ozawa (1999), one 
of Japan’s most influential politicians and the former leader of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP).  
In 1994, in an issue of the Yomiuri Shimbun, a relatively conservative newspaper, 
three possible proposals for the revision of Article 9 was published for its readers’ 
consideration. The first point included replacing the second paragraph63 with a new 
article that both banned conscription and also authorized the attainment and usage of a 
self-defense force under the command of the Prime Minister. The second point was to 
introduce a new article, one that would authorize international cooperation activities, 
such as participation in peacekeeping missions. The third and final point was to add a 
sentence into the first paragraph that would ban weapons of mass destruction, glossed as 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, a clause which the existing Constitution does 
not have.64 Though these points of revision were never formally brought before the 
Japanese Diet, provide us with insight into the type of revisions that readers of the 
Yomiuri Shimbun were interested in seeing. 
The following year, wanting to contribute to the conversation, the more 
progressive Asahi Shimbun produced a document that included six broad proposals for 
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revisions. It suggested keeping the peace clause intact and instead (1) incorporating an 
international cooperation law, (2) creating a peace support corps, and (3) scaling down 
the SDF to confine their mission to the defense of Japan alone. In addition they also 
recommended that the revision include (4) a replacement for the outdated Cold War 
security arrangements, (5) a statement that fostered the idea of maintaining peace in the 
Asian region, and (6) a measure or initiative aimed at potentially transforming the United 
Nations into a “healthier world body”.65  
Looking at both the Asahi Shimbun proposal and the one that was printed in the 
Yomiuri Shimbun in the year prior, it is clear that for the Japanese, the Gulf crisis was not 
only an international crisis but a domestic crisis as well. As such the security debates that 
arose destroyed the tight right (LDP) - left (SDJP) division over the constitution,66 and 
we begin to see more similarities among both parties in terms of reforming Japan’s 
security policies as none purported getting rid of the pacifist nature of the Japanese 
Constitution of 1946. Instead constitutional revision support on both sides was aimed at 
establishing Japan's right to self-defense.67 In addition, they all propose formally adding a 
clause to the Constitution allowing the Japanese to formally contribute to international 
peacekeeping missions. It was within this context that the revision of Article 9 came to be 
discussed by a group headed by Ozawa Ichirō, the former leader of Japan’s Liberal 
Democratic Party, in 1999. Within this group Ozawa advocated for Japan to become a 
“normal’ state, suggesting that (1) rewriting Article 9 so as to regain Japan’s right to to 
have war potential for self-defense and to exercise the right of collective self-defense, (2) 
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sending the SDF to participate in UN PKO, and (3) gaining a a seat as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council.68  
In his rewrite of Article 9, Ozawa, realizing that the public would not give up its 
pacifist symbolism, advocated for maintaining the two paragraphs of the peace clause but 
adding a third paragraph that clarified that the previous paragraphs did not prohibit Japan 
from maintaining the military power necessary to protect themselves against attack by a 
third country. His proposed addition reads as follows: ‘The regulation in paragraph 2 
does not prevent the maintenance of military power for the purpose of exercising Japan’s 
right to self defense against military attack by a third country’. Additionally Ozawa, 
believing that the United Nations was ‘the only global organization for peace,’ proposed 
adding a new article to the Constitution following Article 9. This new article would ‘In 
order to maintain, and restore, international peace and safety from threats to, the collapse 
of, or aggressive actions against, peace, the Japanese people shall contribute positively to 
world peace, through various means including taking the lead in participating in 
international peacekeeping activities, and supplying troops.’ 69  
Though the three aforementioned proposals for Constitutional revision all came 
from various political perspectives within Japan none purported getting rid of the pacifist 
nature of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. Instead they are all aimed at establishing 
Japan's right to self-defense. In addition, they all propose formally adding a clause to the 
Constitution allowing the Japanese to formally contribute to international peacekeeping 
missions. So while we do see an increase in support for constitutional revision, this new 
momentum was aimed at clarifying and outlining the specific capabilities of the 
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government in terms of security and peacekeeping rather than necessarily re-militarizing 
the country, though Ozawa’s proposal could potentially be read as such. By the end of the 
1990s however none of these proposals were ever formally brought before the Diet and 
deliberated for implementation, as public opinion around Constitutional revision was still 
too low.70 This however changed with the dawn of the 21st century and the rise of 
security concerns within the international community. 
 
Politics of Fear: Terrorism, Abduction, and Security Concerns in Northeast Asia 
 
 At the beginning of the 21st century we see another jump in support levels for 
revision of the Constitution.71 This time however, the fear of not being able to adequately 
make contributions to the international community was not the only fear propelling the 
Japanese public to seriously consider allowing their government to make revisions to the 
postwar constitution. In fact, this second wave of support for revising the constitution 
stemmed from two major security concerns: (1) the apparent instability in the 
international sphere with the sharp increase of terrorist activities around the world since 
the start of the 21st century and (2) the emergence of Japanese security concerns mainly 
in relation to territorial disputes with China and North Korea’s nuclearization. 
On September 11, 2001 planes hijacked by Al Qaeda operatives brought down the 
twin towers in New York and severely damaged the Pentagon in Washington DC. In the 
aftermath nearly 3000 people were left dead, some of whom were of Japanese nationality. 
Following this crisis America increased its security measures and the Japanese 
government under Prime Minister Koizumi gave firm assurances of his willingness to 
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cooperate with President Bush and counter terrorist activities. The events of 9/11 were 
only the first in a long line of terrorist attacks that took place in the early 2000s. With the 
Istanbul Explosion of 2003, the Madrid train bombings of 2004, the London bombings of 
2005, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the twice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
on December 27, 2007, and the series of coordinated bombings and shootings in Mumbai 
between November 26-29, 2008 just to name a few, are all signifiers of the rising 
instability within the international community during the early 2000s. From the political 
perspective that Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi presented at that time, Japanese 
“national interest was seen to lie in close coordination with United States, even though 
terrorist activities from Middle Eastern groups were a far less serious problem for Japan 
them for many other countries.”72 As a result the Japanese government’s active support 
for American anti-terrorist efforts can be seen as a by-product of the criticism that Japan 
received during 1990s from Americans in relation to Japan not pulling its weight in terms 
of collective self-defense.  
 During the 1990s to the present, rising national security concerns in terms of 
North Korean nuclearization and abduction of Japanese citizens in conjunction with 
territorial disputes with China in the midst of their emergence as a major power in the 
region have aided in maintaining the shift in Japanese public opinion towards the revision 
of Article 9. The Japanese government, led by the LDP at the time, utilized the 
prevalence of increasing hostility within the international and regional environment and 
the rise in support at home for Constitutional revision to once again bring constitutional 
revision to the forefront. The party placed the issue on its active agenda in 2005 and 
releasing a new set of potential constitutional revisions in October of that year. In this 
                                               
72 J.A.A. Stockwin, Governing Japan, pg. 109 
27 
version, the LDP planned to keep the first paragraph of Article 9 intact but do away with 
the second paragraph and ultimately create three new paragraphs to take its place. The 
new second paragraph would give Japan the right to have military forces for self-defense 
under the control of the Prime Minister. The third paragraph would re-affirm that SDF 
activities have to be approved by the Diet and other necessary authorities. While the 
fourth paragraph would ascertain that the SDF may gain permission to cooperate 
internationally “so as to maintain the peace and security of international society, as well 
as maintaining public order in emergency situations, and in order to defend the people’s 
livelihood and freedom,” aside from their main duty to act as Japan’s main source of self 
defense.73 
Looking at the results from public opinion polls from the early 2000s we see that 
in April of 2005, 61 percent of Japanese citizens who responded to a Yomiuri Shimbun 
poll were in favor of constitutional revision, with 44 percent of that population in favor of 
revising the peace clause specifically.74 The results from a 2007 Yomiuri Shimbun poll 
proved to be similar as it reported 46.2 percent of its respondents voting supporting that 
the Constitution be amended while only 39.1 percent voted that it should not be amended. 
When the participants who answered that the “Constitution should be revised” were 
asked why, 47.6% answered that they “believed that new issues had arisen in which the 
current constitution can not handle” in relation to issues of self-defense and 27.2 percent 
additionally answered that they “believed that amendment needed to happen in order to 
state the Japanese right to self-defense, and stipulate the existence of the Self-Defense 
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force”.75 Taking the aforementioned into account we see that international criticism in 
conjunction with international instability and security concerns in the Northeast Asian 
region have all contributed to the rise in support that we see for Constitutional revision in 
Japan between the end of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. 
 
Part 4: Government Initiative for the Promotion of Constitutional Revision 
 
Since the beginning of the late 1980s the Japanese government has placed 
increased importance on creating a distinguished ‘Japanese national spirit’ through the 
provision of a more nationalistic education for elementary and middle school children. 
This was because for some conservative members of the government and their pro-
revision allies in the right-wing Liberal Education League and the Society for Textbook 
Reform, the history of ‘shame’ that was taught to secondary-school students had serious 
implications on their desire to create a national identity that would allow for the ultimate 
rearmament of Japan.76 Wanting to stop this trend and rebuild national pride among the 
people, the Japanese government pushed for revision of the Course of Study to place 
increasing emphasis on inculcating Japanese children with a “greater sense of patriotism 
and self-awareness of their ‘Japanese-ness’...”.77  
Dating back to the beginning of the post-war period the issue of textbook reform 
and how best to represent Japan and its history to Japanese children had always been 
apart of widespread debates. On one side of the debate, we see the more liberal party, 
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advocating for not over beautifying Japan’ past but rather taking a neutral stance and the 
including of teachings of Japan’s war invasion, including references to the comfort 
women system and the attempts of individuals from Korea and China to claim private 
compensation for their war time suffering. However on the other side of the debate we 
see nationalists and conservatives greatly against this, arguing that education needed to 
be more nationalistic in nature. The country was thoroughly split on this issue and as a 
result we see history textbook, “…which play a central role in the production of a 
national memory and identity, become the battleground for political and intellectual 
contests over how best to render the past, and, in so doing, mold the present and the 
future.”78 
As the debates on history education in Japan heated up, we see what becomes 
known as the ‘third textbook offensive’ emerging as the once relaxed textbook screening 
process of the early 1990s was reversed due to efforts made by the Ministry of Education 
and the ruling LDP party to tighten up the curriculum and textbook screening process, 
and place more emphasis on patriotic education. They wanted to accomplish this through 
essentially reworking textbook content to emphasize the role of the emperor and 
downplay Japan’s aggression during the war, but also through legislation such as making 
the raising of the national flag and the singing of the national anthem compulsory.79 In 
fact, as apart of their education reform package, the government proposed the revision of 
the Fundamental Law of Education to put more of an emphasis on the ‘cultivation of 
patriotism’, ‘respect for Japanese history and traditional culture’ and ‘international 
coexistence’. They also called for the “re-examination of history textbooks to include 
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‘new perspectives,’ which directly references the views and ideals put forth by the group 
Tsukuru kai, one of the main organizations pushing for a more nationalistic education.80 
At the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, we see a number of well-known 
individuals and government institutions creating propaganda in order to aid the Tsukuri 
kai’s platform for more nationalistic education. For example, in 1997, Namikawa Eita 
created a pamphlet titled, ‘The Inquities of History Education in Japan during the Postwar 
Period’, which pointed to statistics showing that students overwhelmingly answered ‘no’ 
to the question of whether or not they would defend their country if they were attacked,81 
indicating in his view a dangerous lack of loyalty or affection for the nation. In the 
following year the cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori in his both the controversial manga 
Sensōron (On War), used his medium to illustrate to the public what he described as 
Japan’s decadent society, “...decadent partly because the youth of Japan [had] forgotten 
the sacrifices of their grandfathers.”82 The Ministry of Education for their part introduced 
a controversial series of teaching materials that focused on civic responsibility, respect, 
love of country, and so on known as “Kokoro no nōto” in hopes of advancing support for 
more nationalistic education. This series was distributed in 2002 and onwards to all 
primary and middle schools as a new ‘teaching aid’ designed for use both by teachers in 
moral education classes and also by parents at home. It was deemed as controversial 
because its contents resembled “reminiscent of pre-war authorized textbooks” with its 
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most problematic sections dealing with ‘groups and society’,83 particularly with their 
references to patriotism as they symbolized that “neo-conservatism [had] taken hold and 
could lead inextricably to a more nationalistic education system reminiscent of the prewar 
and wartime periods.”84 Tawara, who was from the opposition camp acknowledged that 
the books “…seek to impress upon Japanese children the importance of a Japan that can 
contribute to international affairs, or more worrying for Tawara, ‘a Japan that can go to 
war’. He even went on to states that “effects of the contents of these books will be 
demonstrated in the next ten years when the students currently using them will reach 
voting age.”85 
In addition to reforming education, the Japanese leading political party (LDP) and 
pro-revisionary forces have commandeered reviving the national symbolic significance of 
the Yasukuni Shrine in order to facilitate the shifting of Japanese national identity away 
from pacifism and increase support for Constitutional revision. Originally used as a 
device for creating a psychology whereby soldiers fought and sacrificed their lives in war 
for the emperor and the state86, the Yasukuni Shrine is now being utilized as a tool by the 
Japanese government to ‘praise’ and ‘beautify’ the ‘sacrifice’ of war and giving one’s life 
for their country in hopes of facilitating additional support for the revision of Article 9 
and the remilitarization of Japan.87 This strategy by the Japanese government has been 
largely controversial among members of the international community, such as Taiwan, 
China, and South Korea, as the Yasukuni Shrine has Class A war criminals enshrined on 
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its property.88  However the Yasukuni Shrine is seens as extremely significant to the 
government’s vision of constitutional revision as its doctrine encompasses the idea that 
“[t]he spirit of Yasukuni is not only a spirit that soldiers have in wartime. It is a Japanese 
spirit that all Japanese people should adhere to identically in both war and times of 
peace.”89 
Will Abe’s Dream of Remilitarization Become a Reality? 
  Over the past four years, the leader of the LDP, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has 
stated his desire to revise the Japanese Constitution, more specifically the peace clause 
that denounces Japan’s right to possess the means to wage a war. As of July of this year, 
Abe has never been closer to achieving his goal of seeing Constitution revision as the 
Liberal Democratic Party-led ruling coalition scored a sweeping victory in the Upper 
House elections that took place on July 10th. This victory has proven to be monumental 
and a pivotal turning point in the history of Japanese politics as for the first time in 
seventy years, it bequeathed the Diet’s pro-revision forces within the Liberal Democratic 
Party  (LDP) of Japan, the two-thirds majority in the Upper House that they needed in 
order to proceed with their long held ambition of initiating Japan’s first constitutional 
referendum. Despite these major gains, Abe's ambitions of seeing a remilitarized Japan 
by the end of his premiership still seems like a distant dream.  
In order for Japan to enact constitutional revision, not only does the Upper and 
Lower Houses of the Diet have to approve of the constitutional change, but over 50 
                                               
88 South Korea, Taiwan, and China all see the Japanese Prime Minister and other important political 
figures’ worship at Yasukuni Shrine as a sign that the Japanese have not deeply ruminated on the impact of 
their wartime atrocities. 
89 Tetsuya Takahashi. “National Politics of the Yasukuni Shrine.” p. 162 
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percent of the Japanese public.90 And though support for Constitutional revision was on 
the rise during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, recent years has seen in drastic shift in 
majority support for Constitutional revision shift from being in favor of revision to being 
against it.91 In all three major Japanese newspaper polls, fifty percent of the respondents 
or more were opposed to revision of the constitution, revealing that the majority of 
Japanese are cautious to supporting the change despite the effort by politicians to move 
the debate forward.92 In fact, according to results from the Asahi Shimbun poll on July 
14th of this year, only 35 percent its respondent’s favored “constitutional revision under 
the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership while 43 percent opposed it. Similarly in a 
Nikkei poll on July 25th, only 38 percent of respondents were willing to embrace 
“constitutional revision under the Abe Cabinet” compared to the 49 percent of 
respondents that did not.  
When looking specifically at the viability of the remilitarization of Japan, this 
occurrence seems even more unlikely as the last six years has seen Japanese public 
opinion favoring adjusting Article 9 through policy changes by reinterpretation rather 
than by revising it. 93  
When respondents were asked their reason for supporting Constitutional change, the top 
three responses from those who took Yomiuri polls from 2011 until this year was “Policy 
change by reinterpretation has become too confusing” as the top response, followed by 
“Japan confronts new issues that cannot be addressed under the current constitution, such 
                                               
90 See Article 96 of The Japanese Constitution. 
91 See sharp reversal of support for Constitutional revision following 2011 in Figure 1 of Appendix. 
92 Sheila A. Smith. “Japanese Public Opinion on Constitutional Revision in 2016.” p. 2 
93 Percentages by year in accordance with results garnered from yomiuri Shimbun polls on support for 
adjusting Article 9 through reinterpretation (2010: 44%; 2011: 45%; 2012: 39%; 2013: 40; 2014: 43; 2015: 
40; 2016: 38%). Compared to the percentages of respondents in favor of revising Article 9 (2010: 32%; 
2011: 32%; 2012: 39%; 2013: 36%; 2014: 30%; 2015: 35%; 2016: 35%). See figure 2 in Appendix. 
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as contributing to international cooperation.”, and “The Constitution should include 
reference to the right to self-defense and to the Self-Defense Force.”94 Looking at the 
results that were garnered from Asahi Shimbun polls between 2007and 2012 in regards to 
reasons that Japanese citizens supported Constitutional revision was the notion that there 
are new rights and rules that need to be included. The percentage of respondents who 
believed that the Constitution needed to be revised due to the Article 9 having problems 
was actually rather miniscule.95  
It is clear that the vast majority of Japanese do not wish to revise Article 9. In fact 
in the 2016 polls, Asahi still reported that 68 percent of their respondents were against 
revising the Article 9 (while 27 percent claimed they were for revision). According to the 
responses that the Yomiuri polls garnered it seems that 82 percent of the respondents 
would not revise Article 9’s first paragraph, which includes Japan’s pledge to not use 
force for the purpose of settling international disputes.96 Both conservatives and liberals 
in Japan seem to have similar views in regards to why Article 9 should not be revised.  
Both Asahi and Yomiuri respondents rationalized their choices in very similar language: 
Asahi respondents opposed to revise “because [the constitution] had brought peace”; 
Yomiuri respondents opposed revision “because it is a world-renowned peace 
constitution.”97 This conclusion is not resolute as there anything could happen in the case 
of regional security in Asia that could push the Japanese to remilitarize. In addition with 
                                               
94 See Figure 3 in Appendix. 
95 Percentage of respondents that thought Article 9 had a problem according to Asahi Shimbun polls: 6 
percent in 2007, 13 percent in 2008, 15 percent in 2009, 15 percent in 2010, 14 percent in 2011, and 17 
percent in 2012. See Figure 4 in Appendix. 
96 Though it should be noted that in regards to changing the language in the second paragraph, which says 
that Japan will not maintain military forces, however 48  percent were for it and 48 percent were against it. 
I speculate that this is in accordance with Japanese citizens desiring to legitimize the SDF forces by 
including them in the Constitution. 
97 Sheila A. Smith. “Japanese Public Opinion on Constitutional Revision in 2016.” p. 7 
35 
the election of Trump to U.S. presidency public opinion in Japan could shift towards 
constitutional revision as Trump's rhetoric on how to handle the U.S. Japan alliance could 
jeopardize the Japanese commitment to pacifism in exchange for the peace of mind that 
having their own military power would have in relations to the fear of Trump making 
good on his promise, pulling American troops out of Japan, and leaving the Japanese high 
and dry with limited security in what they consider a "high tension environment with 
tensions brewing between them China, and South Korea in terms of territorial disputes 
and North Korean nuclear crisis. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1: Asahi Shimbun public polling data on support for Constitutional revision from  
1983-2016 
 
 
Figure 2: Yomiuri Shimbun polling data on Japanese public opinion on what should be 
done with Article 9. 
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Figure 3: Yomiuri Shimbun polling data on reasons that Japanese citizens support 
Constitutional Revision 1995-2016 
 
 
Figure 4: Asahi Shimbun polling data on reasons Japanese public support Constitutional 
Revision 2007- 2012 
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Figure 5: Asahi Shimbun polling data on support for revising Article 9, 1997-2016 
 
 
Figure 6: Nikkei polling data on support for revising Article 9, 1995-2016 
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Figure 7: Yomiuri Shimbun polling data on support for revising Article 9, 1995-2016 
